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Family Labour Supply: A Dynamic Analysis
Christian Dustinann* John Micklewright* 
March 1992
Abstract
The effect of means-testing of unemployment benefit paid to married men 
on the labour supply of their wives is a relatively neglected topic in the anal­
ysis of the disincentive effects of unemployment benefits. Such analysis as 
has occurred has been undertaken in a static framework, neglecting the fact 
that any disincentive from means-testing lasts only as long as the husband is 
unemployed. We introduce dynamics by using a two-period model to study 
the decision of the wife whether or not to work when her husband becomes 
unemployed. In the second period there is uncertainty about future job op­
portunities for both husband and wife. The model is capable of explaining 
participation behaviour that may seem non-optimal if analyzed in a purely 
static context.
‘European University Institute, Florence






















































































































































































1 In tr o d u c tio n
In many OECD countries the labour force participation of women married to unem­
ployed men is found to be considerably and significantly lower than that of women 
married to employed men.1 There are a variety of reasons that could be responsible 
for this phenomenon. Unemployment may be unevenly distribuled among regions, 
or men who are more likely to lose their jobs may have selected wives who likewise 
have a higher propensity to become unemployed. In the case of Britain, a number 
of recent empirical papers emphasize the family means-test in part of the unem­
ployment benefit system as a possible explanation for this phenomenon (Dilnot and 
Kell (1987), Garcia (1989, 1991), Kell and Wright (1990)). These contributions 
analyse a neglected aspect of the literature on unemployment benefits and incen­
tives. In the situation where the husband’s unemployment benefit is means-tested 
on family income there is a sharp reduction in husband’s benefit if the wife works, 
implying a disincentive to her labour supply. We investigate this situation using a 
theoretical model which provides for intertemporal considerations which we believe 
are important to the problem.
We assume a means-tested unemployment benefit of the type described be­
low. Our description is based loosely on the main features of British social assis­
tance benefit Income Support (IS), its forerunner Supplementary Benefit (SB), and 
the German unemployment assistance Arbeitslosenhilfe (AH) and social assistance 
Sozialhilfe (SH) schemes. These benefits are a prominent part of the income support 
systems for the unemployed in Britain and Germany, existing alongside unemploy­
ment insurance benefit.2 (The features we describe may also be found in other 
countries where means-testing of unemployment benefit is important e.g. Australia 
where all unemployment benefit is means-tested.)
An unemployed husband receives a benefit means-tested dn family income of
‘For information on eleven countries, sec Micklcwrighl and Giannelli (1991), Table 1
21S and All are received by about two-thirds arid one-third of the male unemployed stock in 
Britain and Germany respectively (Micklewright, 1990, Figure lb, and Brinkmann, 1988, Table 
2). One million Germans who received SH at some time during 1988 reported loss of employment 




























































































maximum size ft. The level of b could depend on the number of children (IS, SB, 
All, SB), housing costs (SB, SB), region (SB), and past earnings (All). If the wife 
works, the husband’s benefit is reduced, unit for unit, in respect of any earnings 
of the wife above a threshold k and up to the level k + ft, at which point benefit 
entitlement expires. In Britain, k does not vary with household characteristics while 
in Germany it increases with the number of children in the case of the All scheme. 
Assuming that the couple pool their income, there is in effect a 100% marginal tax 
rate when the wife’s earnings are in the range [fc, fc + ft]. Accordingly, one might 
expect the optimal policy for the family where the husband is eligible for the means- 
tested benefit to take account of the disincentive for the wife. One solution involves 
supply of the wife’s labour so as to result in earnings below the threshold k. An 
obvious way to do this is through non-participation in the labour market.
This purely static explanation of the wife’s behaviour, implicit in the above 
mentioned literature, suffers from a major drawback. It implies that either the hus­
band stays unemployed forever or that the wife is certain of a job offer in the future 
at the same wage as any current offer. There are no intertemporal considerations 
which enter the family’s decision making while the husband is unemployed. These 
considerations could be expected to be important where in reality the mean length 
of a spell of unemployment may be less than 6 months and where the labour market 
for the wife - like that for her husband - may not be perfect. As a consequence, the 
static model struggles to explain why some women do appear to supply labour with 
earnings in the range [k, k -f ft], i.e. where the 100% implicit tax rate binds (see for 
example Dilnot and Kell, 1987). Analysed in a static framework, this behaviour is 
either non optima] or reflects demand side constraints which result in labour supply 
on the flat segment of the budget constraint as being optimal.
In our model we recognise explicitly that the disincentive to the wife’s labour 
supply is temporary, lasting only so long as the husband stays unemployed. We thus 
consider the family’s optimisation problem in an dynamic context. This allows for 
intertemporal considerations and as a result rationalises behaviour which is difficult 
to explain in a static framework. We introduce uncertainty about both the length 




























































































a two-period model, we show that if (a) the decision of the wife not to work in
»
period 1 reduces the probability of getting an equivalent job in period 2, and if (b) 
the husband receives a job offer in period 2 with some positive probability, then the 
wife may participate in period 1, despite an implicit 100% marginal tax rate at the 
margin. She will do this if the disadvantage from working due to the means-test is 
out weighed by a future gain resulting from this decision.
2 L ab ou r S u p p ly , M e a n s-T e s tin g  a n d  U n c e r ta in ty
We use a two-period model and assume husband and wife act so as to maximise 
a family utility function.3 Jobs are offered at the beginning of each period. The 
decision whether or not to accept an offer has also to be made at this time. We 
assume that the husband receives any ofTer and takes his decision before the wife 
decides about any offer she receives. Once employed or unemployed, the status has 
to be maintained over the whole period. (We assume a two-state world and use the 
terms unemployment and non-participation interchangeably to describe the state of 
non- employment.) There is no utility from leisure nor disutility from work. The 
family maximises indirect utility obtained from income in the two periods.
We are interested in the participation behaviour of women who are married 
to unemployed men. Therefore, we assume that the husband does not receive a 
job offer in period 1 and is unemployed throughout that period. In order that the 
entitlement to unemployment benefit can exist for the husband we assume that this 
unemployment was initiated involuntarily.4 Note that we do not rule out the possi­
bility of earlier periods of unemployment for the husband. His spell of unemployment 
in period 1 may be the continuation of an existing spell in which limited duration 
unemployment insurance benefit, free of a means-test, may have been received at 
an earlier date.
'^The means-test’s impact in reducing one partner’s income through another partner’s actions 
suggests that a bargaining approach could be a useful alternative in future work.
’Penalties to voluntary unemployment are a standard feature of unemployment benefit schemes 




























































































At the beginning of period 2, the husband will get a job offer with probability 
p, with 0 < p < 1. The wife receives a joh offer for period 1 with certainty.6 
This could simply be an offer of continued work in a job held prior to her husband 
becoming unemployed. If the wife turns down this offer we assume she will get a 
job offer at the beginning of period 2 only with probability q < 1, while she receives 
an offer with certainty should she accept the period 1 offer.6 In other words, if the 
wife accepts the period 1 olfer, she can be certain of retaining her joh in the second 
period. We justify these assumptions below.
To keep the model simple, we assume that in both periods there is only one 
type of job for the wife, paying earnings w F for a fixed labour supply, and one 
type of job for the husband, paying wM also for fixed hours. (Single hours-wage 
packages are all that is available to both husband and wife.) While unemployed, the 
husband receives a benefit means-tested on family income of maximum size fc. We 
assume that the husband’s opportunity cost of working is lower than wM — fc. He 
will therefore accept any job offer in period 2.
If the wife participates in the labour market, her earnings have no implications 
for her husband’s unemployment benefit up to an amount k. All earnings above k 
result in a redi|ction of fc at the rate of 100%, so long as wF < k +  fc, at which point 
her husband’s benefit is extinguished. In other words, her net contribution to family 
income in the range between k and k + fc is zero. In the case that the wife does not 
work, the family receives the equivalent of the opportunity costs of her employment,
The wife’s opportunity costs v may include travel-to-work costs, expenses on 
eating outside the house during working hours, and expenses for child care. There 
is likely to be a fixed opportunity cost for any labour supply and a rising cost 
with increasing labour supply in line with, for example, increasing child-care. It is
6We wish to study the decisions of women who do have the possibility of working in the first 
period.
6The simplifying assumption that the wife receives a job offer in period 2 with probability one, 
should she accept the period 1 offer, could easily be relaxed as long as the probability that the 




























































































possible that the opportunity cost may include unemployment benefit for the wife.7
The assumptions about the wife’s period 2 job offer probabilities are crucial 
to the model. The state dependence in labour market transitidus which is implied 
here may be justified on several grounds. A quit from an pre-existing job in period 
1 will result in a loss of any insider status. As a result, the wife may be excluded 
from regaining the job with certainty in the future. The acceptance of a job ofTer, on 
the other hand, or the continued employment within an existing job, confers insider 
status and a continuing employment probability, partly through labour law.7 8
Should the wife accept the period 1 job offer she contributes an amount s to 
the family’s income, where
We assume v < wF, k < w1' , and s < v. The wife’ one-period earnings if she 
works are greater than her one-period opportunity cost of not working; the fixed 
wage-hours package results in earnings above the threshold level disregarded by the 
means-test; her contribution to one-period family income is lower if she accepts the 
offer. In other words, we concentrate on those situations in which if the family 
behaved myopically, as in a static model, the wife would never participate so long 
as her husband was eligible for means-tested unemployment benefit.
7On the other hand, the rejection of a job offer entails the risk of disqualification from ben­
efit in the typical unemployment benefit system. This may occur with high probability if non­
participation is the result of a voluntary quit (as may be the case for the wife in our model in 
period 1) since this is a relatively easy event for benefit authorities to monitor. Atkinson and Mick- 
lewright (1991) provide some information on the incidence of disqualification from unemployment 
benefit.
80ur assumptions rule out other factors which would produce the same qualitative effect on 
incomes and decision-making as that of state dependence in transitions. Quitting could lead to 
future search costs or lower future wages even if joh offers in the future were always certain. We 
prefer our formulation as capturing what we see as the basic nature of many labour markets: people 
in jobs cannot be sure of taking an ’’unemployment holiday” with certainty; people who get a joh 
offer know that they may not get one in the future; people with jobs often expect them to continue.
k if k < wF < b + k 





























































































[Figure 1 about here]
Figure 1 gives an example. The vertical axis measures the wife’s net contribution to 
family income. The horizontal axis measures her earnings. The flat segment between 
k and k + 6 of the schedule relating earnings to the net contribution represents the 
operation of the means-test. The dashed line indicates the opportunity costs of 
offering time tp the labour market. The intercept denotes the fixed component of 
her opportunity costs, v. The upward slope of the line indicates rising opportunity 
costs with labour supply. If the earnings from the job offered to the wife lie between 
«1 and v-j, her opportunity costs of accepting the job would be higher than her net 
contribution to family income. A static model would predict that this woman will 
not accept an bours-wage package implying earnings in this range. Our analysis 
below shows that this is not necessarily the case when intertemporal considerations 
have been taken into account.
Risk-neutral behaviour
With risk-neutrality the family’s objective is to maximize lifetime income, / ,  given 
by
1 = / '  + (2)
( 1+0
where P and P denote first- and second period income, respectively, and r  the dis­
count rate. Given our assumptions, the control variables of the family’s optimization 
problem are the wife’s decision whether or not to accept any job offers in period 1 
and in period 2. The problem is a dynamic programming problem in its simplest 
form and solvable by backward reduction. Since the probability of receiving a job 
offer in period 2 depends on the wife’s participation decision in period 1, the family’s 
expected period 2 income is a function of the wife’s period 1 decision. Let the binary 
variable d \  i =  1,2, indicate the wife’s decision on any job offer in period t, were an 
offer to be received (she always receives an offer in period 1 by assumption); d1 = 0 
signifies that she would reject an offer and d‘ =  1 signifies that she would accept. 




























































































and g(d') =  1 if dl =  1.
Consider first the wife’s decision in period 2. The family’s expected income in 
this period should the husband receive a job offer (which he would always accept), 
W k m p ) ’ is g'ven by;
E ( I lmp) =  max  {[tnM + 9 ( d ') u /  + (l -  ^(d1)) u], [tuM + u]} . (3-a)
If the husband receives no period 2 offer, expected period 2 income, will
be:
E(Iump) =  max {[& + 9(rfl) s + (1 -  ?(<0) v]. I* +  ”])• (3-b)
The first terms in square brackets in (3-a) and (3-b) represent family period 2 income 
should the wife be prepared to accept a period 2 job offer (cP =  1). The second 
terms represent the income should the wife decline any period 2 offer she receives.
__ Given assumptions wF > v > s stated earlier, it is the second term in (3-a)
and the first term in (3-b) which represent maximum family income. The wife’s 
optimal decision is to accept any offer in period 2 if her husband gets an offer and 
to reject it if he does not. These decisions reflect the removal of the implicit tax 
imposed by the means-test if he gets an offer and its continued effect if he does not. 
Since the model has only two periods there is no need in the latter case for the wife 
to take account of any impact of her decision on future offer probabilities. The wife 
therefore reacts to the means-test disincentive as if it were permanent.
Taking into account the probability of the husband receiving an offer, expected 
period 2 income is therefore:
E(I*) = PE ( l l nv) + ( l - p )  E ( I lmp) = p[wM +q(<i')wF+ ( l - q(d'))v] + ( l - P)lb+v]
( 4 )
The family’s present value of expected lifetime income now depends only on the 




























































































The expression in the first line of (5) represents family’s lifetime income should the 
wife accept her (by assumption certain) job offer in period 1. The expression in the
the decision whether or not to accept the offer is not clear-cut. It depends on the 
probabilities p and q and the parameters of the model. Subtracting the second 
expression from the first, we obtain the following index:
The wife will accept an offer in period 1 if IV is positive, and she will turn down the 
offer if N is negative.
Equation (6) shows that the decision problem in the static framework intro­
duced at the beginning of the paper is a special case of the dynamic problem. The 
wife’s participation decision in a static context corresponds to the dynamic problem 
where the wife, regardless of her period 1 decision, is always offered the same job in 
the future, q(0) =  q( 1) =  1, or the husband stays unemployed for the rest of his life 
with certainty, p = 0. For p = 0 or q =  1, the wife’s decision problem in period 1 
depends solely on whether s > v (accept offer) or s < t> (reject). She need pay no 
attention to future income streams. However, for 0 < q < 1 and 0 < p <  1, it may 
be rational to accept the period 1 offer even though income in that period is lower 
as a result (a < v).
Comparative statics of (6) yield:
second line represents lifetime income should she decline the offer. In this period
N  =  (a -  v) + [p(l -  q)(wF -  o)] ( 6)
dN  =  (1 +  r) ds — [(1 + r) + p ( l — g)]dt> — (u — a) dr + (7)




























































































The wife is less likely to turn down the period 1 job offer if her earnings arc high 
and if the probability that her husband receives a job olfer in the next period is 
high. High opportunity costs of the job offered to her, a high discount rate, and a 
high probability of receiving an offer in period 2 should she not work in period 1, 
all favour the likelihood that she will not accept the period 1 offer.
The wife’s net contribution to household income, s, is a function of the level 
of her husband’s unemployment benefit, b, the disregarded level of her earnings,
k, and her earnings, wF: s =  s(b,k,ruF). ffolding wF
ds — [6s/6k]dk + [6s/6b\db, with
6s f > 0  : wF < b +  k
»  [ = 0 : wF > f> + k
6s f < 0 : wF > ft -f k
"  1 =  0 : wF < b + k
( 8)
(9)
Should the wife’s job result in the means-test applying at the margin, wF < fc + k, 
an increase in the disregarded level k favours her decision to participate. The level 
k depends on the structure of the benefit system and differs among countries. Other 
things equal, one would expect the participation rate of wives married to unemployed 
men to be higher in those countries with a relatively high k. A change in k will not 
affect the wife’s period 1 decision should the job offered to her not result in the 
means-test applying at the margin, wF > b + k. An increase in the husband’s 
unemployment benefit does not affect the participation decision if the job offered to 
the wife is such that the means-test binds at the margin, wF < 6-ffc. But it provides 
a disincentive effect by reducing the wife’s net contribution to family income should 
wF be larger than b+ k.
Risk-averse behaviour
Although the assumption of risk-neutrality is often adopted in the analysis of the 
behaviour of the unemployed, for example in the basic job search model, it seems 




























































































the family is risk-averse we can no longer simplify the problem to one of maximising 
lifetime income. The indirect utility function must now be strictly concave rather 
than linear as in the risk-neutral case. We outline the effect of risk aversion on the 
wife’s period 1 decision diagrammatically.
To do this, we assume that the husband will receive a job offer in the next 
period with certainty: p = 1. One can think of this representing the situation where 
all male unemployment is short-term. In contrast to the situation where p =  0, this 
simplification concerning the husband’s prospects does not return us to the static 
model. The crucial uncertainty in the dynamic model remains: the risk that the 
wife does not receive a job offer in period 2 if she turns down a job offer in period 1.
The certain prospect for the family results if the wife accepts the period 1 
offer. This guarantees the wife a further job offer in period 2. Under our simplifying 
assumption the husband is also guaranteed an offer in that period. Lifetime utility 
in the certain prospect, Vc, is given by
Vc — V ( l c) where Ie = b s + (wM + tvF)/(\  +  r) (10)
The uncertain prospect results if the wife rejects the offer in period 1. There will 
then be two possible states in period 2: she will receive a further job offer (state A) 
or she will receive no job offer (state B). The expectation of lifetime utility in this 
uncertain prospect, V/u, is given by:
E (V ' )  = g V ( l A) + 0  - q ) V ( I B) (11)
where I A = b + v + (wM + wF)/( 1 + r )  and IB — b + v -f (wM + u ) /( l  -fr). The 
problem is illustrated in Figure 2 in state-contingent income space. The family’s 
lifetime income should state A realize - the good prospect - is measured along the 
horizontal axis, and lifetime income in state B - the bad prospect - along the vertical 
axis. For some values of wF, v, s and wM, which satisfy the assumption wF > v > s, 
point 7 represents the two possible family incomes should the wife make the risky 




























































































wife accepts the offer. Income in this case is certain and 6 therefore lies on the 
45 degree line. The indifference curve V — V represents the family’s preferences 
under risk-aversion. The tangent to this curve at the point of intersection with the 
certainty line has slope q/( 1 — q), the odds ratio of the wife receiving a job offer in 
period 2. This tangent also corresponds to an indifference curve in the case of risk 
neutrality.
[Figure 2 about here]
In the case depicted in the diagram by point 7 the wife would decide to accept the 
period 1 offer if the family is risk averse, and she would not if the family is risk 
neutral. Aversion to the uncertainty surrounding income in period 2 leads her to 
accept that offer despite expected lifetime income being lower as a result. Since the 
convexity of the indifference curves depend on the degree of risk aversion, one can 
conclude that higher risk aversion will increase the likelihood of acceptance of the 
period 1 offer.
The indifference curve will pivot around the point 0 if the probability that the 
wife receives an offer in period 2 changes. Point 7 will move along the line a , a  if the 
opportunity cost v changes. The diagram thus illustrates some of the comparative 
static results obtained earlier in the risk-neutral case. An increase in q and in v will 
both favour the decision to turn down the period 1 job offer.
3 C o n c lu s io n s
The possible effects on labour supply of unemployment benefit have provoked a 
multitude of research studies. In this paper we have looked at an aspect of the 
subject which has been largely overlooked within this research effort: the effect of 
means-testing unemployment benefit on the labour supply of the claimant’s family. 
Given the importance of means-testing in some countries’ unemployment benefit 
systems this is a subject deserving serious attention.
In addressing the issue we have emphasised that a number of features need to 




























































































particular, it is not sufficient in our view to analyse this subject in a static framework. 
The temporary nature of the means-test on the one hand, lasting only so long as 
the claimant remains unemployed, and state dependence in transition probabilities 
in the labour market on the other, mean that intertemporal considerations can be 
expected to enter the labour supply decisions of a family faced with means-test 
disincentives.
To analyse the problem we set up a two-period model of the incentives facing 
a married couple. The wife’s decisions in the first period while her husband was un­
employed had implications for her job offer probabilities in the second. The analysis 
showed that uncertainty surrounding the second period could induce participation 
behaviour that seemed to be sub-optimal in a simple static framework, namely the 
wife working despite her net contribution to family income being zero.
The participation rates of women married to unemployed men may be affected 
by means-testing in those countries with benefit systems which involve a means- 
test on family income. Our analysis suggests that a simple explanation in terms of 
high implicit marginal rates of tax should be treated with caution. Any disincentive 
effect is likely to vary, amongst other things, with the employment prospects of both 
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